# Under 25 PIC

## ****1NC****

#### *[1:50]*

**A. Counterplan Text: Just governments ought to require that employers pay a living wage to workers age 25 and over, but not to workers younger than 25.**

**The harms of unemployment outweigh the marginal income benefits that a living wage would provide. The CP allows more workers to retain jobs and allows young workers to develop skills for advancement to higher paying jobs.**

GRAY 13 [Judge Jim Gray, an American jurist and the 2012 Libertarian Party vice presidential nominee. He was the presiding judge of the Superior Court of Orange County, California., “False Allure of a Minimum Wage”, 2013, DDA]

**The 2012 platform for the Democratic Party promised to raise the national minimum wage from $7.25 to $9.50 per hour, and to index future changes to inflation. This, as well as arguments for a “living wage,” sounds like a good and compassionate idea, but it has a false allure. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that about** 70 percent of **all** minimum wage workers are teenagers, college students and secondary earners **who are** in households that**, for the most part,** are not poor. **Thus only about 30 percent of the extra income generated by minimum wage laws goes to people below the poverty line.** So **if** the idea is to relieve poverty, **the** minimum wage laws **do not provide nearly the assistance that is commonly believed.** Instead, **the major effect** of these laws **is to** reduce the number of **low-wage** jobs available for entry-level positions**. For example, harsh as this may sound, some workers are simply not worth $9.50 per hour. Thus no jobs will be available for them and they will be out of work. In addition, some companies simply cannot stay in business if forced to increase their labor expenses. That means they will have to make some choices. One choice is to lay off some workers and attempt to get by with a smaller workforce. This financially assists the remaining workers because they receive a raise, but it also results in a more hectic workplace. But obviously this also results in a large hardship for the laid-off workers. In addition, some companies will not be able to adjust, so they will go out of business, which results in all of their employees losing their jobs as well. But some companies, such as fast food restaurants, are so labor intensive that they cannot adjust or mechanize. Thus they are generally forced to continue with the same staff at higher wages. Some of these companies will successfully manage the changes, but others will close their doors. The bottom line is that the marginal benefits for those employees who retain their jobs due to the laws requiring artificially higher wages are outweighed by the hardships inflicted upon businesses and those workers who lose their jobs. All of this means that minimum and** living wage laws should be repealed**, because they cause more harm than good. But unfortunately this is not possible in today’s political climate. So instead, functional libertarians recommend that we begin by repealing those laws** for everyone who is younger than 25 **years of age.** This would result in **many** entry-level jobs being retained and **even** created for youngerworkers**. Not only would that give more young people jobs, it would also afford them a timely and critical opportunity to learn and develop a positive work ethic. And this will, in turn and over time,** [and would] give them large opportunities for advancement**. Employers are almost always searching for workers who, in addition to being able to perform their work capably, are reliable, responsible and pleasant. So** once workers **are able to acquire and** demonstrate **these beneficial and** productive traits, they **almost unfailingly either** receive a raise in salary, **or procure a higher-paying job elsewhere.** Depriving young entry-level workers of the opportunity to develop and demonstrate **these** skills is enormously counter-productive **and harmful to workers, businesses and society as a whole. For example, isn’t it better for society to have 100 entry-level people working at $7.25 per hour than 80 similar people working for $9.50 per hour? Finally, the needs of those workers who are not worth the artificially increased wages cannot effectively be addressed by the government meddling in the workplace. Those needs are better addressed through education, training and counseling services. All the government’s meddling accomplishes is keeping those unskilled workers from being able to get or hold onto a job. Of course, once we pursue the partial measure of repealing minimum wage laws for the younger workers, soon the voters and politicians will see that the artificial approach of minimum and living wage laws is ineffective for everyone else as well. So this will, in turn, likely result in a full repeal of all of these counterproductive laws.**

**-Judge Jim Gray**

**B. Competition**

1. **Functional- The aff mandates that all workers are paid a living wage, and the CP doesn’t require employers to pay young workers a living wage. Perms are severance because the AC never specified a group of employers to receive living wage so it’s implied that the aff requires all employers to be paid living wage.**

#### C. Solvency- CP solves the entirety of the aff because the workers over 25 who need the additional wages to stay out of poverty will get it.

#### No poverty DA to the CP- almost all workers making living wage under the age of 25 are above the poverty line.

#### WILSON 12 [Mark Wilson, Mark Wilson is a former deputy assistant secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor. He currently heads Applied Economic Strategies, LLC, and has more than 25 years of experience researching labor force economic issues, “The Negative Effects of Minimum Wage Laws he Negative Effects of Minimum Wage Laws”, Policy Analysis No. 701, Published by the Cato Institute, DDA]

According to the Bureau of Labor Statis- tics, 1.8 million paid-hourly employees were paid the federal minimum wage of $7.25 in 2010.6 These 1.8 million employees can be broken down into two broad groups: Roughly half (49.0 percent) are teenagers or young adults aged 24 or under. A large majority (62.2 percent) of this group live in families with incomes two or more times the official poverty level.7 Looking just at the families of teenaged minimum wage workers, the average income is almost $70,600, and only 16.8 percent are below the poverty line.8 Note that the federal minimum wage applies to workers of all ages.9

#### D. Net Benefits:

#### 1. Unemployment- Empirics prove that minimum wage hikes significantly harm employment opportunities for teens and entry-level jobs.

#### ECONOMIC POLICIES INSTITUTE 10 [Economic Policies Institute, The Employment Policies Institute (EPI) is a nonprofit research organization dedicated to studying public policy issues surrounding employment growth. EPI research has quantified the impact of new labor costs on job creation, explored the connection between entry-level employment and welfare reform, and analyzed the demographic distribution of mandated benefits. EPI sponsors nonpartisan research that is conducted by independent economists at major universities around the country, “New EPI Analysis Shows Teen Unemployment Rate Averages 32.7 Percent in Washington: At Seventh Highest in the Country, EPI Points to Consequences of Recession and Minimum Wage Hikes”, June 2010, DDA]

WASHINGTON, DC – A new EPI analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data estimates that the average unemployment rate for teens in Washington was 32.7 percent as of April 2010 – the seventh highest in the country. Economists point to the consequences of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression, and increases in state and federal minimum wages. BLS data also show that the overall unemployment rate in Washington was 9.1 percent in May 2010, from 9.3 percent in April 2010. “More than one in four teens in Washington is looking for work without success, and it’s not just because of the recession,” said Michael Saltsman, research fellow at the Employment Policies Institute. “This summer, minimum wage mandates are keeping teens from finding a job.” Economists confirm the harm caused by minimum wage hikes. Most recently, a study from Ball State University attributed the loss of 310,000 teen jobs to the 40 percent increase in the federal minimum wage between July 2007 and July 2009. By increasing labor costs, higher minimum wages force employers to raise prices or cut costs. Consumers pinched by the recession aren’t willing to pay a higher price, so employers cut back on customer service instead – meaning fewer hours and fewer opportunities for entry-level employees like teens. “It’s the least-skilled and least-experienced that are hit hardest as a result of increases in the minimum wage,” Saltsman continued. “They’re missing out on the valuable career skills that come from a first job.”

#### This creates a cycle of poverty where young workers never gain the job experience they need to become more productive workers.

#### BAIRD 02 [Charles W. Baird, Economist with a Ph.D from University of California, Berkeley, former Professor of economics for 34 years at California State University, East Bay (CSUEB), former director of the Smith Center for Private Enterprise Studies at CSUEB, member of the editorial boards of three academic journals and an adjunct scholar with the CATO institute, his specialty is the law and economics of labor relations, “The Living Wage Folly: How Living-Wage Ordinances Harm Workers and Taxpayers”, Published by the Foundation for Economic Education, June 1, 2002, DDA]

Not only will the least productive workers lose their jobs, every time a legal minimum-wage increases, young people just entering the labor force with little experience and training will find it more difficult to get first jobs. The surest route to becoming a productive worker for a person who has little training and education is on-the-job experience. All increases in legal minimum wages make it more difficult for the disadvantaged to follow that route. Sometimes profit-seeking entrepreneurs will try to avoid layoffs by cutting nonwage compensation paid to workers. For example, reductions in paid vacation time, employer contributions to retirement funds, employer-paid medical insurance, and rates of sick leave accrual can sometimes offset the effect of a higher legal minimum wage. If so, affected workers will keep their jobs, but they will not be any better off than they were before the minimum-wage increase. In fact, they will probably be worse off because more of their compensation will be taxable than before. Profit-seeking entrepreneurs also try to avoid layoffs by attempting to pass the wage increases on to customers in the form of higher prices. In the private sector this is often difficult to do because of competition. Competition among American firms is not much of a problem in the case of an increase of the federal minimum wage, because it applies to all American firms alike. Firms affected by state minimum wages, to the extent they are not less than the federal minimum, are somewhat constrained from passing on cost increases to customers by interstate competition. It is much easier for governments to pass costs forward to consumers, because the consumers are taxpayers who do not have the option of refusing to pay. Firms affected by municipal LWOs may simply respond by raising the prices they bid for municipal contracts. Municipalities that try to offset those higher costs with higher taxes face jurisdictional competition within their own states as well as others. People can simply vote on the resulting tax burdens with their feet. But this discipline is not always effective. LWOs are often followed by municipal tax increases.

#### 2. Job Skills-

#### Job training and experience is significantly more valuable to young workers than a pay increase.

#### ALEC 14 [American Legislative Exchange Council, The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization. It provides a constructive forum for state legislators and private sector leaders to discuss and exchange practical, state-level public policy issues. The potential solutions discussed at ALEC focus on free markets, limited government and constitutional division of powers between the federal and state governments. The organization respects diversity of thought; it is a non-partisan resource for its members, which include more than 2,000 Republican and Democratic state legislators. ALEC is a think-tank for state-based public policy issues and potential solutions. It publishes research and writing on issues that are of importance to its members. It holds meetings where people from public and private sectors share their views. It also develops model policies and resolutions on economic issues. These materials can be helpful resources for state legislators who have an interest in free markets, limited government and constitutional division of powers between the federal and state governments. ALEC does not lobby state legislatures. ALEC’s task forces cover a variety of economic issues, including job creation and growth, state tax issues and budget solvency, education and healthcare reforms, corrections and reentry programs, civil justice reforms, and sound energy and environmental solutions, “Raising the Minimum Wage: The Effects on Employment, Businesses and Consumers”, March 2014, DDA]

Although increases to the minimum wage encourage more teenagers to attempt to join the workforce, mandated wage increases limit the number of job opportunities available to them at a time when teenage unemployment rates are already at a staggering 20 percent.20 For many young people looking for a job, the primary value that employment provides is on-the-job training, rather than the initial low pay. More than 60 percent of young employed earners are enrolled in school during non-summer months, and for 79 percent of them, it is a part-time job.21 Minimum wage jobs can often serve as a stepping stone to later career goals, so young earners are often more likely to need experience in basic job skills than a small wage increase. Increasing the minimum wage and removing job opportunities from teenagers and young adults could suppress their wage-earning abilities later in life when they are more likely to need their wages to support a family.22

\*read youth unemployment DA at the bottom

\*cut cite 22 in ALEC

## Industries

### Retail

[http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp869.pdf]

#### No net impact on employment in the retail sector, however the plan disproportionately harms young workers.

This paper has examined the effects of increases in real minimum wages on separations and hours worked in the Swedish retail sector during 2001–05. The econometric framework relies on the identification of workers affected by minimum wage increases, depending on their position in the wage distribution, and contrasts outcomes for these workers to those for a control group of workers, with slightly higher wages. The boom experienced in the industry during the period analysed implies that the cards have been stacked against finding strong results on employment from minimum wage increases. Despite this, the initial analysis, for manual workers, suggests that separations do increase as minimum wages increase. The findings also indicate that substitution between worker groups in response to changes in minimum wages is important in retail; for example, as minimum wages increase more workers are separated in the treatment group, but fewer workers are separated in the control. The median worker is located in the control group, according to Table 1. Thus the results showing disemployment effects in the treatment group and the opposite outcome in the control seem consistent with a union model in which members bargain over a minimum wage that maximizes the utility of the median voter (Booth, 1984). In general, though, total hours and hours per remaining worker do not change much as minimum wages increase, but there is a distinct negative effect on overall hours among the young. On the whole, the loss of hours due to more separations among the treated seems to be mitigated by the fact that these workers initially put in relatively fewer hours. This result suggests that analyses that deal with employment consequences of increasing minimum wages solely by examining worker flows, but disregard hours, may exaggerate the overall decline in employment to the extent that job losses are concentrated among low-paid, part-time workers.

#### Methdology

The econometric approach in this paper relies on the identification of workers affected by minimum wage changes, depending on their position in the wage distribution, and contrasts outcomes for these workers to those for unaffected workers, with slightly higher wages. The hypothesis in the standard competitive model of the labour market is that increasing minimum wages contribute to more separations from employment in the affected group and that decreasing minimum wages are associated with more job accessions, while total hours worked should decrease (increase) with increasing (decreasing) minimum wages. Relaxing the assumption that efficiency units are the product of hours and workers, Strobl and Walsh (2010) show that effects of minimum wages on employment and total hours are ambiguous in a competitive model framework. The predictions regarding changes in hours among remaining workers (in case of an increasing minimum) and already employed workers (in case of a decrease) are ambiguous, even in the standard competitive model. The econometric approach is similar in spirit to the ones used by, for example, Currie and Fallick (1996), Zavodny (2000) and Neumark et al. (2004) for the US, Abowd et al. (2000) for the US and France, Kramarz and Philippon (2001) for France, Stewart (2004) for the UK and Skedinger (2006) for Sweden. With the exception of Zavodny (2000) and Abowd et al. (2000) for the US (but not France), and Stewart (2004), these studiers find that minimum wages create disemployment effects. Few studies have attempted to estimate the effects of minimum wages on hours and the results are mixed. The results in Couch and Wittenburg (2001) and Stewart and Swaffield (2008) suggest an hours-reducing effect of increasing minimum wages in the US and the UK, respectively, while Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009), Zavodny (2000) and, for the UK, Connolly and Gregory (2002) and Dickens et al. (2009) find small or no significant changes in hours worked. Despite the obvious potential for strong disemployment effects of minimum wages that cut large into the wage distribution, very few studies on the subject exist in the Nordic countries. Skedinger (2006) finds that increasing minimum wages decrease employment in Swedish hotels and restaurants during the period 1979–99. The introduction of special and lower rates for teenagers in 1993 eliminated negative employment effects of subsequent increases for this particular group of workers. For Finland, Böckerman and Uusitalo (2009) are unable to find any employment- increasing effects of the introduction of sub-minimum wages for young workers in the retail sector in 1993–95. The different results for Sweden and Finland may be due to the fact that the Finnish minimum wage reform was of a temporary nature, while the lower rates for teenagers in Sweden were permanent. A crucial assumption of the chosen econometric approach is that transitions in and out of employment and changes in hours do not differ between affected (the treatment group) and unaffected workers (the control group) beyond what is captured by available controls, such as worker and firm characteristics. If unobserved variables, correlated with minimum wage changes, contribute to, for example, fewer transitions among high wage workers than among workers with lower pay, this assumption is violated. For example, one could imagine that turnover is higher among low-paid workers for structural reasons. Unlike previous studies, I am able to check the robustness of the estimates in this respect by considering, as an alternative control group, workers in the same industry with the same wages as the treatment group, and with similar turnover characteristics, but who are not covered by the minimum wages. Lower-level non-manual workers are covered by a different agreement, with lower and non-binding minimum wages, and thus seem suitable for examining differences in structural turnover across groups in the wage distribution. The data set is rich and contains detailed information on various wage components, age, gender, occupation, region, various measures of hours worked and firm size. Data on minimum wages have been added from the collective agreements. Many manual workers in Swedish retail are on part-time schedules, so there should be a potential for adjustment through changing hours in this industry. The following section of this paper discusses the fixing mechanisms of minimum wages in the retail industry and the evolution of minimum wages over time. The data set is described in Section 3, while the econometric model and the results are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes the paper.

#### Moar methodology

The data set has been obtained from the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv) and covers all member firms of the employer organization the Swedish Trade Federation over the period 1998–2008. There are 13,000 member firms with a total of 300,000 employees in the Federation, implying a coverage of about two thirds of all employees in Swedish retail (Svensk Handel, 2011). The observations are annual and refer to September each year. The firms are bound by the collective agreements signed by the Federation and these cover all employees, regardless of union membership. The data are based on payroll records and include information on employee category (manual or non-manual), various components of pay, actual and usual hours worked, gender, age, occupation, region and number of employees in the firm. Since real minimum wages decline in one year only (2008), the analysis is limited to examining the employment consequences of increasing minimum wages. The sample period is further restricted to exclude the year 2007, due to tax reforms introduced in that year which are likely to confound the results.5 The data set contains unique identifiers for firms and workers. The definition of separations follows standard procedures in the kind of data used here. A separation in year t+1 is defined as the worker being present in the data in year t, but not in t+1, while the firm was present in both t and t+1 (but not necessarily during other periods). It is not possible to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary separations in the data. Since some, mostly small, firms for various reasons may not report data in a given year, even though they are still members of the Federation, this procedure ensures that the employees of non-reporting firms are not erroneously classified as separated. It should be noted that separations thus are defined in relation to employment in the industry, not in the firm. Given that involuntary separations cannot be identified, separations defined in this way capture relatively more exits into unemployment than a firm-based measure. Since not all retail firms are members of the Federation, a transition to a non- member firm may erroneously be classified as a separation in the data. However, there is little to suggest that transitions to non-member firms serve as escape routes from high minimum wages to any large extent. 6 The collective agreements influence norms for wage-setting also in non-member firms and Swedish labour law grants far- reaching rights to unions taking action against firms without collective agreements, regardless of whether the firms pay sub-minimum wages or not. The computation of changes in hours (between t and t+1) is also conditioned on the presence of the firm in the data in two subsequent years. The measure of hours is based on usual hours, not actual, in order to filter out disturbances specific to the reporting month. A worker not present in the data is assigned a value of zero hours. The data contain a direct measure of the regular hourly wage (fast timlön), which is likely to be measured with less error than the more commonly available alternative in the form of an hourly wage calculated as wages divided by hours (over a given period). A minority of manual workers in the retail industry are salaried. For these workers, regular full-time monthly wages (fast heltidsmånadslön) have been transformed into regular hourly wages under the assumption of a 40-hour working week. The wage concept used thus excludes premiums for unsocial hours, overtime pay, bonuses and fringe benefits, in order to correspond to the minimum wage in the collective agreements. Minimum wages for manual workers have been collected from the Retail Agreement (Detaljhandelsavtalet) and from circulars, distributed by the Federation to employers, for non-manuals. Each worker in the data set has been assigned a minimum wage, depending on the relevant personal characteristics, such as worker category, age and professional experience within the industry. There is no explicit information in the data set on experience, which is one of the determinants of minimum wages for manual workers. Instead, this information had to be imputed from the data.7 Since minimum wages take into account experience up to 3 years, this procedure eliminated the same number of years from the data set (1998–2000). Due to the nature of the data set, with some firms opting not to report, imputed experience is understating actual experience for some workers (which implies too low a minimum wage). Tenure with the firm, which is an explanatory variable in the regressions, has also been computed by me and along similar lines. The analysis of manual workers is limited to cashiers and sales staff, the two major occupations that are covered by the Retail Agreement. Observations on cashiers and salespersons constitute 95 per cent of the data for manual workers. Only lower- level occupations among non-manuals were included, such as clerks and sales staff, amounting to 22 per cent of the observations for non-manuals. There is no information on education in the data, but given the narrowly defined occupations I regard this to be of little concern. Workers with very low or high wages have been excluded (below 75 per cent of the minimum wage or more than three times the median wage). Finally, workers with multiple jobs were excluded since a unique minimum wage could not be defined for these workers. After these exclusions, the number of observations for manuals is 246,811. Figure 6 shows the hourly wage distribution for manual workers in the sample, in 2008. The various minimum wages are indicated by the vertical lines A–E. The spikes at these rates suggest that minimum wages are indeed binding for manuals in the retail industry. The spikes are quite distinct, with no smoothing around the minimum rates, which indicates that wages are measured with little error. Between 2 and 8 per cent of workers are on each of the five minimum wages and more than one fourth (28 per cent) are on either of them.8 The distribution of monthly wages pertaining to non-manuals, shown in Figure 7, is quite different and closer to the textbook version of wage distributions in competitive labour markets. A mere 0.5 per cent of these workers are on either of the two minimums. The spikes that do appear in the figure can be explained by clustering at round number salaries, like 20,000 or 25,000 SEK, rather than clustering at minimum wages (at A and B). This suggests that minimum rates are not binding for lower-level non-manuals. As in previous empirical analyses of the employment effects of minimum wages conditional on the worker’s position in the wage distribution, the data set is partitioned into four groups, (see, e.g., Abowd et al., 2000). The idea behind this exercise is to identify workers affected by minimum wage changes – the “treatment” group – and a suitable “control” group, close to the treatment group in the wage distribution but assumed not to be affected by minimum wage changes. With increasing minimum wages, and under the assumption that workers are paid their marginal product, a worker belonging to the treatment group is at peril of being laid off unless his or her productivity increases enough in order to match the higher minimum. Workers in the control group, with slightly higher wages (arbitrarily set at a maximum of 5 per cent higher in the chosen specification), are however not directly affected by the minimum wage increase. Assuming constant marginal productivity, the hypothesis, in line with the competitive model, is that workers in the treatment group, but not in the control, are laid off as a result of the minimum wage increase. Micro data on wages typically include some workers who, for various reasons, are paid less than the minimum wage. These workers are assigned to the “below” group and thus do not form part of the treatment group. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the four groups of manual workers in the sample (with some information also on non-manuals). It is apparent that many manual workers in retail are affected by minimum wage changes as 41 per cent of observations belong to the treatment group. Around 5 per cent of observations are sub-minimum. These observations may be explained by some employers not (yet) having adjusted wage levels to the recent collective agreement or measurement errors, most likely occurring in the tenure variable. If tenure is underestimated, due to some firms being absent in the data, the minimum wage rate pertaining to these workers will also be underestimated. Despite the narrowly defined wage interval (5 per cent) relative to other studies in the field, the control group among manual workers contains many observations (19 per cent). Given the compressed wage structure in Sweden, this observation is not out of line with expectations. Real minimum wage increases, measured as log mwt+1 – log mwt, are higher, on average, in the treatment group than in other groups. The average increase among the treated manual workers was 7.9 per cent, with a variation (not shown in the table) between 0.1 and 14.8 per cent. There is thus substantial variation in minimum wage increases, both over time and across worker groups. Many manual workers are part-timers in the retail industry and their usual hours worked per week ranges between 27 and 31 on average, depending on sample group. In general, the lower-paid work fewer hours. For example, individuals in the treatment group work over 5 hours less per week than those in the control. The change in hours among all workers is negative (partly by construction of the variable, since separated workers are assigned zero hours). For workers remaining in the industry, changes are positive but relatively small, less than 1 hour. Turnover is very high, with 37 per cent of manuals separating in the industry each year in the treatment group (recall that the measure relates to exits from the industry, and excludes transitions between firms within the industry).9 A worker’s attachment to the job is likely to influence mobility. There is unfortunately no direct information on the use of fixed-term contracts, which is widespread in the industry, but there are other variables in the data which could help capture the degree of attachment to the job. Besides part-time status and the hourly wage, there is a variable in the data set indicating whether the worker is salaried and there is also information on the share of unsocial hours pay of total pay. Salaried workers are typically less mobile while workers with much unsocial hours pay are likely to be students working mainly during evenings and weekends, with little long-term attachment to the job. Among the treated manuals, around 11 per cent are salaried and 19 per cent of total pay is compensation for unsocial hours, on average. Here, the variation among workers is large, with many having no such pay at all and some earning almost all their pay from working unsocial hours. Working hours should be influenced by available variables, such as age, gender, occupation and wage. However, family-related variables, in particular the presence of small children in the household, are among probable determinants of working hours, at least among females, that are missing in the data set. Table 1 includes descriptive statistics for lower-level non-manuals, who have been assigned to the four groups based on the fictitious minimum wage structure for manuals (the table reports statistics only for the treatment and the control groups). Although relatively fewer workers among non-manuals are found in the treatment and control groups, turnover characteristics are very similar. For example, 38 per cent in the treatment group are separated next period, which is close to the figure for manuals. An important difference, though, is that non-manuals rarely work part-time and that they put in longer hours than manuals, about 34 hours per week on average. The lower incidence of part-time work among non-manuals may be explained by their tasks being less tied to unsocial shop hours and fluctuating customer demand than is the case for manual workers. Table 1 also shows that non-manuals tend to be somewhat older than manuals in the corresponding groups.

## 2NR

### PICs Good

#### Plan has been implemented—there is lit.

#### MANNING 12 [Alan Manning, Head of the Economics Department at the London School of Economics where he has taught since 1989, He is one of the UK’s leading labour market economists and has published widely on the impacts of the minimum wage, monopsony, immigration and technological change on wages and employment, “Minimum Wage: Maximum Impact”, April 2012, DDA]

Discussions over how the minimum wage should vary with age have traditionally focused on having lower minimum wages for those below the age of traditional adulthood. For this reason, and because young workers earn much less than older workers, the UK NMW has a lower rate for those under 21 (formerly 22). This aspect of the NMW’s design helps to reduce the relative generosity of the minimum wage for young people for whom, as we have seen, it is far higher than for adult workers relative to the average wage. Nonetheless, even after the age of 21 there is considerable variation in the general level of wages and the impact of the minimum wage. In other words, the motivation for a lower youth minimum does not disappear once workers turn 21. Indeed, in some countries e.g. the Netherlands, the adult minimum does not apply until the age of 25.

#### *[2:45]*

#### A. COUNTER-INTERPRETATION: The negative may advocate for a [conditional] counterplan that includes parts of the plan if that counterplan would have been a topical affirmative, the counterplan is mutually exclusive with the aff, and the competition for the counterplan is derived from the affirmative’s specification of a term in the resolution or lack of specification thereof.

#### B. I meet

#### C. STANDARDS:

o/v- the CP could have been a topical aff which means no abuse because they chose not to specify which works they defend

#### Ground:

o/v- no harm to ground- The CP doesn’t do part of the aff so any reason that it’s good to give a living wage is a disad to the counterplan that they can win

#### a) The aff gets to choose their advocacy, which provides the only stable division of ground between the aff and neg. My strategy is premised on what is exclusive with the AC, so it’s proactively unfair to place ad hoc restrictions on neg counterplans because that harms stable ground for the negative and prevents me from forming a strategy.

#### b) Their interp guts neg ground- under their interp, the aff can make it’s advocacy as broad as possible to include all good aspects of a wage policy. Then the neg has to advocate for something that includes none of these good policy options so the negative will never be able to win the comparative desirability of a policy option.

#### c) My solvency advocate proves they are destroying core neg ground. Many experts agree that some people should get a living wage, so my ground is terrible if I have to defend no living wages.

#### d) Their interp kills CP ground because all counterplans in the topic lit include some aspect of the aff, e.g. a just government as the agent that enacts the advocacy. No CPs would be competitive because the neg would have to advocate for a different agent doing a different action. Kills fairness because counterplans are a huge portion of the topic literature- authors are comparative between different actions and don’t just say living wage bad in a vacuum, instead they offer alternatives. Status quo is terrible ground for the negative because economic trends universally show increasing inequality of incomes so aff would win every round off a risk of offense that living wage could be an improvement. Also kills education because we no longer learn about a huge portion of the topic lit and neg arguments are limited to status quo good.

#### e) I don’t hurt aff ground- instead of them having to win the entirety of their aff, they now only need to win that a small portion of their aff is good, which is a fair burden because they got to choose the entirety of their aff.

#### f) ground is reciprocal, they can make perms including all of the aff and parts of the CP which lets them pic out of the CP

#### g) They have infinite prep to prepare and frontline their advocacy so the onus is on them to defend the entirety of that advocacy. The only way to check back against the huge aff advantage from parametricizing is allowing the neg to concede certain parts of the affirmative and read a counterplan against other parts. It’s unreasonable for me to have to negate every single part of the AC when they have the strategic advantage.

#### Ground is key to fairness because it determines offensive capabilities and offense is how we access the ballot.

#### 2. Topic Education:

#### a) PICs are a huge portion of the topic literature- many authors write about how living wages are beneficial for certain portions of the population but not others- my solvency advocate proves

#### b) depth- PICs force the aff to go in depth researching and preparing a defense of each aspect of their advocacy- also increased breadth because negs can craft more unique advocacies rather than just generics every round

#### c) PICs force the aff to read a broader amount of topic literature to choose the best advocacy that can have every aspect defended.

#### Overview:

#### Prefer the counter-interp if I have links to fairness and education and they only have links to fairness- even if fairness and education are better in a vacuum, a marginal increase in fairness is outweighed by a complete decrease of education. This means reject the interp if I win a link to fairness and education and they don’t link to education. Additionally, there is no possible way they can link to education—their interp literally removes a portion of the topic literature without expanding what we learn about in any way.

#### D. VOTER:

Education is a voter- debate is an educational activity founded on the basis of teaching debaters valuable skills for the rest of their lives so they detract from the only long-term goal of debate. Vote on education because a) the substance they chose to run destroys any potential value of debate, b) you have a role as an educator to discourage and punish uneducational practices by voting them down for ruining the educational value of this round. *This is a proactive reason to vote them down for reading PICs bad- they not only destroyed the educational value of this round through unnecessary theory, but they removed an argument that increases education.*

#### Education outweighs fairness:

1. **It’s the only terminal impact debate. Substance doesn’t matter unless there’s an educational benefit to discussing it.**
2. **Fairness questions who did the better debating, but education is a pre-requisite because it tells you what good debate is. It could be fair for the round to be decided through a coin flip, but that’s not “good debating” so there’s no link to the ballot. It could be fair for us to both blitz 60 a prioris but that shows who’s better at spreading, not who’s a better debater. This means education comes first because it answers the prior question of what good debating is, so links to fairness have no impact if the round isn’t educational.**
3. **Harms to fairness can’t be determined- there are 100 factors determining who has an advantage such as having more coaches or experience. Absent knowing who starts at an advantage, we don’t know if fairness skews are good or bad because they might just rebalance the scales. However, education is always valuable so it comes first because you’re 100% certain voting for my interp is good.**
4. **Schools will stop funding debate if debate is no longer educational, so education is a pre-requisite to being able to debate at all.**
5. **Fairness only has instrumental value in achieving ends, but isn’t intrinsically valuable. Education provides an actual reason for an activity existing, as opposed to just being a possible useful feature of that activity. This comes before other voter arguments because if the activity is useless, there’s no reason to care about ruining it.**

#### Specifically, it’s good for PICs to be conditional:

#### Also, if they win PICs bad, vote me up. PICs aren’t going away and theory won’t remove them from debate- empirically proven because PICs have been read for years. Thus if PICs are bad, vote negative because it will encourage better substantive affs that can beat PICs so PICs will no longer be viable and will die out substantively.

## Extra

### Solvency

#### MANNING

Discussions over how the minimum wage should vary with age have traditionally focused on having lower minimum wages for those below the age of traditional adulthood. For this reason, and because young workers earn much less than older workers, the UK NMW has a lower rate for those under 21 (formerly 22). This aspect of the NMW’s design helps to reduce the relative generosity of the minimum wage for young people for whom, as we have seen, it is far higher than for adult workers relative to the average wage. Nonetheless, even after the age of 21 there is considerable variation in the general level of wages and the impact of the minimum wage. In other words, the motivation for a lower youth minimum does not disappear once workers turn 21. Indeed, in some countries e.g. the Netherlands, the adult minimum does not apply until the age of 25.

The result of the UK’s current approach is that, as Figure 12 confirms, the fraction of adults paid at or below and near the minimum wage varies very substantially with age. Among 22 year olds, around 10 percent of workers are paid at or below the NMW. This figure then falls sharply with age before flattening out at around 3 percent in the late 20s. One implication of this fact is that around one-third of all those paid the NMW are under 30, while only 20 percent of the adult workforce as a whole falls into this age group.

These distributional aspects of the current minimum wage policy are important when it comes to targeting the low to middle income group. In particular, with many of the beneficiaries of today’s minimum wage being young people in full-time higher education and/or living with their parents, the system—although by definition well targeted at low paid individuals—is not particularly well targeted at low income households. A higher minimum wage for older workers, perhaps those aged over 30, could quite significantly improve this focus. Figure 13 makes this point clear by plotting, for workers within 10 percent of the adult minimum wage (and who report an hourly wage rate), the fraction that are the head of a household or their partner, or the child of the head of a household. Older minimum wage recipients— even those at age 25 and above—are very substantially more likely to run their own household. Among 22 year-olds, over 40 percent of minimum wage workers are the children of the head of a household. This proportion falls to around 10 percent by age 30, while the proportion of minimum wage workers who are the head of household or their partner rises from about 40 percent at age 22 to over 80 percent at age 30.